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Abstract
Using global data for the period  1960-99, Collier and  expenditure  is, to an extent, a "regional public bad."
Hoeffler  estimate neighborhood  arms races.  They find  Potentially,  there is an offsetting public good effect if
that the level  of military expenditure is strongly  rebellions are deterred  by military expenditure.
influenced by the expenditure  of neighbors.  The authors  However,  instrumenting for military expenditure,  the
estimate an  "arms race  multiplier," finding that an  initial  authors find no deterrence  effect of military  spending  on
exogenous  increase  in  military expenditure  by one  the risk of internal  conflict. So there appears to be no
country is more than doubled  in both the originating  regional public good  effect offsetting the public bad
country and its neighbor.  An implication  is that military  arising from a neighborhood  arms race.
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The authors may be contacted at pcollier@worldbank.org  or anke.hoefflergeconomics.ox.ac.uk.  November 2002.  (23
pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the  endings of work in progress to encourage the excaange of Ideas about
development issuies. An objective of the series is to  get the findinigs out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polisbed.  The
papers carry the names of the authors and  sbouild be cited accordingly. The findings, ntiterpretations,  and conzclusions expressed in this
paper  are enttirely those of the autitors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank,  its Exectitive Directors, or the
couintries they represent.





CSAE, Oxford University and International  Peace Research Institute Oslo
Anke Hoeffler gratefully acknowledges  funding from the Research  Council of Norway (NFR).1. Introduction
In  this  paper  we  investigate  what  determines  military  expenditure.  We  focus
particularly  upon  whether  such  expenditure  is  a  regional  public  'bad',  inflicting
negative externalities across borders.  The classic model in which military expenditure
has this property is an anns race between neighbors:  the purpose of the expenditure is
to provide  defense  against the threat posed by the expenditure  of the neighbor.  The
same  level  of  defense  can  thus  be  achieved  by  the  uncoordinated  arms  race
equilibrium  of mutually  high  expenditure,  or  by  cooperative  expenditure  restraint.
However,  for  many  governments  military  expenditure  has  a  further  function  of
providing internal security.  To the  extent that rebellions  have adverse  neighborhood
effects,  if military expenditure  deters rebellion it is a regional public good.
Previous  studies of the determinants of military  expenditure  are reviewed by Hartley
and Sandler (1990) and by Smith (1995).  The main focus of the literature  has been on
developed country  military  expenditure  during  the Cold  War,  which was dominated
by an arms  race between NATO  and  the Warsaw  Pact.  This phenomenon  generated
both a theoretical  and an empirical  literature.  The  canonical  theoretical  model of the
arms race is that of Richardson (1960), more recent work being surveyed in Brito and
Intriligator  (1995).  The  empirical  literature  naturally  deployed  the  time  series
econometric  approach.  A  smaller  literature  focuses  on  developing  countries,  which
are  our primary  interest.  Deger and  Sen  (1995)  survey this  literature  which  uses  a
cross-section  approach  (see for example,  Maizels  and Nissanke,  1986; Looney,  1989;
Gyimah-Brempong,  1989). The dependent variable is the ratio of military spending to
GDP, commonly referred to as the 'defense burden'. The explanatory variables  include
a range  of political  and economic  factors,  but,  in  contrast  with  the NATO-Warsaw
Pact literature,  arms races are not analyzed.
In this paper we provide what we believe  to be the first integrated  empirical  analysis
of developed and developing country behavior. Section 2 provides the foundations  for
the study by estimating a military expenditure function that incorporates both external
threats  and  intemal  threats.  The  major impediment to such  an  analysis is  a credible
quantitative  estimate  of the  internal threat.  Indeed,  since civil wars are now far more
common than  international  wars,  an omission of the  internal  threat  would  seriously
impair  any  global  analysis  of military  expenditure.  For  this  step  we  rely  upon  our
existing model of the risk of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler,  2002a, 2002b).  We find
that military expenditure  is influenced  by both external and internal threats, with other
influences  being  the  enhanced  political  power  of  the  military  in  non-democratic
regimes,  and  the  financial  resources  available  to  the  govemment.  In  Section  3 we
develop  one  important  implication  of  the  regression  analysis,  the  existence  of.
neighborhood  arms races.  This quantifies  the  'regional  public  bad' nature  of military
expenditure.  To the extent that military expenditure is driven by local arms races and
by  the  political  power  of  the  military,  a  global  reduction  in  spending  would
presumably be without serious  social cost.  However, to the extent that it is effective in
deterring- intemal  rebellion,  military  spending  can  have substantial  benefits.  Indeed,
since rebellion in one country hurts the economies  of neighboring countries, effective
deterrence  is  a regional public  good.  In  Section  4 we therefore  investigate  whether
military  expenditure  is  effective  in  deterring  rebellion.  Section  5  discusses  the
implications for intemational action towards the control of military spending.
32. What Motivates Military Expenditure?
On  average  countries  spend  around  3.4%  of GDP  on  the  military,  but  around  this
average  there  is enormous  variation,  ranging  from 0.1%  to  46%.  In this  Section  we
estimate  a  military  expenditure  function  to  explain  this  variation.  The  dependent
variable  is  problematic  because  data  on  military  expenditure  are  unreliable,  as
discussed  by  Brzoska  (1995).  Here  we  use  data  from  the  Stockholm  International
Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI) for the period  1960-90, updated with data from the
Global Development Network. We measure military spending as a proportion of GDP
for  161  countries,  averaged  over  each  five-year  period  1960-65... 1995-99.  Our
regression  analysis  pools  the  data  over  countries  and  periods,  yielding  563
observations  for  which  we  have  complete  data  on  the  dependent  and  explanatory
variables.  As  discussed  below,  an  important  advantage  of this  approach  is  that  it
enables  us  to  introduce  a  measure  of  internal  threat,  constructed  for  precisely
corresponding periods.
Military  expenditure  is  motivated  partly  by  the  need  for  security,  partly  by  the
lobbying  of interested  parties,  and partly  by the  financial  resources  available  to the
govermment. We include proxies for each of these in our regression.
The needfor security
The most evident  need  for military  expenditure  is  during periods  of active  warfare.
We introduce  dummy variables for participation  in an international  war, and for civil
war.  Unsurprisingly,  both  these  variables  are  significant  (Table  1, column  1).1
International war raises expenditure by 2.5% of GDP, and civil war by  1.8% of GDP.
We next introduce proxies for the risk of international  warfare while at peace. We use
three  indicators  of external  threat  during  peacetime:  the  actual  history  of previous
involvement  in international  conflict, the  military expenditure  of neighbors,  and the
population  of the country.  Previous participation  in  international  conflict  is likely to
be  interpreted politically as indicating a need for military expenditure  whether  or not
it reflects an actual risk of invasion. We might also expect international  war to remain
within  the  political memory  for a long  period.  We  measure  the  previous  history of
participation  by a dummy variable  which takes  the value  of unity if the  country has
been  involved  in  an  external  war prior to the period  in question  but subsequent  to
1945.  The  dummy  is  positive  for  around  20%  of  our  observations.  It  is  highly
significant,  raising  spending by around  1.3%.  Presumably  this  risk  fades  with time,
but  we  could  not  find  any  significant  rate  of decay  over  the  observed  period  so
possibly  the  process  of decay  is  very  slow.  The  military  expenditure  of neighbors
proxies  the  capacity of neighboring countries  to pose a threat.  We  measure  it as the
sum of the military expenditure of neighboring  countries averaged over the  five year
period under consideration,  divided  by the sum  of the five year average of GDP  for
the same countries.
'We  also investigated  variables measuring the months of international  and civil war during the period.
The dummy variables outperform these measures,  implying that military expenditure does not usually
jump in the month that war starts, nor sharply decline the month after  is stops, but rather is also high
shortly prior to, and shortly after wars.
4Table  1: Determinants of Military Expenditure
1  2
International War  2.513  2.616
(0.983)***  (1.217)**
Civil War  1.845  2.186
(0.614)***  (0.685)***
Extemal Threat  1.269  0.602
(0.455)***  (0.821)
Neighbors' Military Expenditure  0.603  0.728
(0.109)***  (0.143)***
In Population  -0.316  -0.528
(0.108)***  (0.155)***
Intemal Threat  3.948  6.666
(2.337)*  (2.812)**
1995-99  -0.730  -0.704
(0.320)**  (0.519)
Democracy  -0.201  -0.125
(0.042)***  (0.058)**
In GDP per capita  0.924  1.109
(0.230)***  (0.332)***




n  563  382
R2 0.56  0.62
Note:  Dependent  variable is the  defense burden.  White  standard  errors in parentheses,  4'*,  *  and  *
indicate  significance at the one, five and ten percent level,  respectively.
The  inclusion  of  the  military  expenditure  of neighbors  allows  us  to  investigate
regional  arms  race  effects.2 Somewhat  surprisingly  in  view  of the  focus  of  the
developed country  literature  upon arms  races, there  are few  studies  in the empirical
developing  country  literature  that  analyze  the  expenditure  of  neighbors  as  an
explanatory  variable.  Dunne  and  Perlo-Freeman  (2003)  are  a  notable  exception.
Countries may be .influenced  by the  expenditure  of neighbors  for reasons other than
military threat. Arf alternative explanation is that, in the absence  of clear indicators of
military  need,  govemments  base their judgment  on the behavior  of their neighbors:
emulation  might  account  for  what  appears  to  be  rivalry.  For  whatever  reason,  the
behavior  of neighbors  is  important,  being  the  most  significant  variable  in  the
regression and we return to it in the next section. Countries with larger populations  are
potentially  more  secure  from  extemal  threat  and  so  have  less  need  of  military
expenditure.  We take  the natural  logarithm  of population.  The variable  is significant
with the expected sign.
2 Since  we regress a country's defense burden on its neighbors' weighted defense burden we avoid to a
certain extent the simultaneity  issues arising from neighborhood effects.  For a detailed discussion  see
Manski (1993).
5We now turn to the analogous  risk of intemal rebellion.  The incidence of civil war is
now  around  ten  times  greater  than  that  of  intemational  war,  and  so  the  risk  of
rebellion  is  potentially  considerably  more  important  as  an  influence  on  military
expenditure  than  is  the  fear  of international  war.  To  our  knowledge  this  has  not
previously  been  investigated.  For  the  dominant  developed  country  literature  on
military expenditure  it was  clearly irrelevant,  while  for developing  countries,  where
intemal security was potentially important, there was no empirical model of  the threat.
We use our recent model to estimate this threat (Collier and Hoeffler,  2002a, 2002b).
The model estimates  the underlying  risk for each five-year period during  1960-99 for
126 countries  in terms of some  observable  characteristics prior to the conflict period.
The model is based on tests of a wide range of economic,  social, political, geographic
and historical characteristics.  Economic factors are found to be particularly important:
the risk of civil war is higher if the level of  per capita income is low, if the growth rate
in  the  previous  period  is  low,  and  if  the  country  is  dependent  upon  primary
commodity  exports.  Social composition  is also  important:  'ethnic dominance',  with
the largest ethnic group constituting a majority of the population but with a significant
minority presence,  doubles the  risk.  Geography  and history also  matter:  a dispersed
population and a recent history of war increase the risk. The modeled risk of civil war
does not take into account events  such as political protests or assassinations,  although
they may well both cause conflict and be early indicators of an escalating  sequence of
events.  However, robustness tests indicate that no important persistent characteristics
of countries  have been omitted as explanatory variables. Hence,  the remaining risk is
due to transient factors such as political events and personalities.
The predicted risk of conflict is not only correlated with the occurrence of conflict but
with its scale.  Potentially,  the predicted  risk of conflict  may therefore  be correlated
with  the  level  of  military  expenditure  not  because  governments  raise  military
spending prior to conflict  in response to objective levels of risk,  but simply because
spending  is higher in  larger conflicts.  To  control for this, we multiply  the predicted
conflict  risk by a dummy  variable that takes the value of zero during those  five-year
periods  in  which  the  country  is  engaged  in  civil  war.  Hence,  all variation  in the
predicted  risk of conflict is confined to periods of peace.  Globally, the model explains
only around  a third  of conflict  risk.  Nevertheless,  the  predicted  risk  of conflict  is
significant  in the  regression  and  its  effect  is  substantial.  Moving  from  zero  risk to
100%  risk  would  increase  military  spending  by  almost  four  percent  of  GDP.
Evidently,  governments raise military expenditure in anticipation of civil  conflict.
The  final variable  proxying  security need  is a dummy  variable  for the period post-
1994.  This is significant and negative, with spending reduced by 0.7% of GDP.  This
is presumably picking up the coordinated reduction in military spending following the
end of the  Cold  War.  Dummy  variables  for all previous  periods,  including  that  for
1990-94  are insignificant.  While the end of the  Cold War obviously pre-dates  1995,
there  were  evidently  substantial  lags  in  implementing  the  implications  for  the
appropriate level of military spending.
The lobbying of  interested  parties
In  addition to  security needs,  military expenditure  may  be influenced  by  lobbying.
The  most evident  beneficiary  of military  expenditure  is  the  military  itself.  A high
level of expenditure  enables a larger size of the military, implying better prospects of
6promotion,  higher salaries,  and  larger bureaucratic  empires.  While the  interest of the
military in military expenditure is probably broadly similar across societies,  the ability
of the military to influence budgetary decisions differs considerably.  We might expect
that  the  greater  the  political  power  of  the  military  interest,  the  higher  would  be
military  expenditure.  The  actual  expenditures  incurred  as  a result  of such influence
may have little or no relation to military capability.  For example, during a long period
of military government in Nigeria the navy gradually accumulated  more admnirals than
it had  ships.  This  high expenditure  on  admirals  is more  plausibly  explained  by  the
position of senior naval officers  in the government  than by the distinctive  operational
needs  of  the  Nigerian  navy.  Indeed,  it  was  indeed  promptly  rectified  upon  the
resumption of civilian rule. We proxy differences  in the ability of the military interest
to  secure patronage-motivated  expenditures  by the extent to which the government  is
democratic.  We postulate  that the  less democratic  is the government  the more reliant
it  is upon the  military and  so the  higher will be  patronage  expenditures  for a given
level  of risk. We use the Polity Im  measure3 of the degree  of democracy,  which rates
the general  openness  of political  institutions  on a scale  of 0  (low)  to  10  (high).  The
variable  is  highly  significant  and the  coefficient  is  substantial:  a  dictatorial  society
will  spend  two  percent  of  GDP  more  on  the  military,  controlling  for  other
characteristics,  than a fully democratic  society.
Thefinancial  resources of  government
Finally, we turn to proxies for the ability to pay. There is no reason to expect military
spending to rise  proportionately  with per capita income.  Superficially,  security  might
be  expected  to  be  a necessity,  so  that  it  would  rise  less  than  proportionately  with
income. In fact,  security appears to be a luxury.  The share of GDP devoted to military
spending  is  strongly  increasing  in  the  level  of  per  capita  income.  This  is  less
surprising than it might first appear. Military  spending is a component of government
expenditure,  and  total  government  expenditure  as  a  share  of  GDP  is  strongly
increasing in income. The explanation for this may simply be that the capacity for the
state to tax and to borrow increases with development.
Countries  may  be  able  to  spend  beyond  the  level  implied  by their  income  because
they  receive money  from  foreign governments.  Usually,  such aid is intended  for the
purposes  of development,  and  then the  issue  is whether  donors  are able  to  enforce
their intentions  on recipient governments.  However,  in rare cases finance  is explicitly
earmarked  for  military  purposes.  Globally,  the  most  notable  instance  of explicit
finance  for military  expenditure  is  the  support provided  by the  USA for Israel.  We
would  therefore  expect  to  find  that  the  level  of Israeli  military  expenditure  has
exceeded that implied by its level of security threat and its income.  To test for this we
introduce  a dummy  variable  for Israel.  It is highly  significant  and very  large:  Israeli
military  expenditure  is almost seven percent of GDP larger than implied  by its other
characteristics  (including the military expenditure of its neighbours).
For  some  governments  development  aid  is  an  important  financial  resource  and it is
particularly  interesting  to determine  the extent  to which this  inadvertently  augments
military spending.  Other evidence  suggests that earmarked  aid can be highly fungible
within a  budget.  For example,  Fezioglu  et al (1998)  find that with the  exception  of
3 See Jaggers and Gurr (1995)  for a full description.
7transport  (where projects tend to be very large), the  sector to which aid is ostensibly
tied does not influence  the sectoral composition of government expenditure.  However,
precisely because  donors  understand  this possibility  and are  particularly  sensitive  to
the accusation of inadvertently  funding military expenditure, they exert a generalized
collective  influence  opposing  military  expenditure.  That  is,  their  defense  against
fungibility  of aid  into  military  expenditure  goes  beyond  their  normal  attempts  to
protect the level of expenditure  for which the aid is earmarked,  to a concerted attempt
to contain expenditure  on the  specific item of concem. Potentially,  donors  could  fail
to  achieve  their earmarked  expenditures  and yet be successful  in curtailing  military
expenditure:  governments could increase  expenditures  in  less sensitive areas.  We test
for this by including aid as a percentage  of GDP, averaged  over the five-year period,
as an  explanatory variable.  As reported  in column 2, aid is completely  insignificant.
Donors  appear  to  be  fully  successful  in  preventing  aid  from  leaking  into  military
expenditure.
The model of column  I is parsimonious,  yet  it provides  quite  a reasonable  level  of
explanatory power with more than half the variance explained.  We experimented  with
variants without disturbing  these core results.  For example, if the dependent variable
is measured as a log, most t-statitics are considerably higher, with the predicted risk of
civil war becoming significant at 5%, but the overall  fit of the model is slightly worse.
We now turn to one particular implication of the model, the existence of regional arms
races.
3. Neighborhood  Arms Races
Our  core  regression  finds  that  in  determining  the  level  of  military  spending,
govemments  respond to the level set by their neighbors.  The  motivation underlying
this  interdependent  behavior  may  be  benign,  as  in  emulation,  or  aggressive.
Distinguishing  between  these motivations  is important  if the  concern  is the prospect
of  intemational  war.  However,  here  our  concem  is  simply  the  level  of spending:
regardless of motivation, such behavior generates neighborhood  arms races.
The  analytics  of  a  neighborhood  arms  race  are  straightforward.  Each  country's
defense burden,  mi, is determined by an exogenous component,  a,, plus an endogenous
response to the expenditure of its neighbors:
n
mi =  ai  +bi* 1mj  where  i￿  jandn=1,...,N  (1)
j=1
We first consider a simple two country case. Assume that an island is divided into two
countries,  so  that  each  country  only  has  the  other  as  a  neighbor.  The  analysis  is
depicted graphically  in Figure  1 showing the military expenditure  response  functions
for two  countries,  A and B.  The initial equilibrium  is at El.  If this  is disturbed by a
unilateral  decision  of  country  A  to  increase  its  military  expenditure,  the  new
equilibrium  will  be  E2 in  which  because  country  B  has  responded  to  the  initial
increase, country A finds it must increase its budget more than it had intended.
If the neighbors have a common exogenous component of military expenditure,  a, it is
straightforward  to calculate  the  effect  of a  common  exogenous  increase  in military
8spending.  In equilibrium the countries have the same defense burden and we can solve
for mi:
i  (1  b)  (2)
Differentiating  (2) with respect to a  shows  the extent to which a common  exogenous
increase  in  military  spending  escalates as  a result of interdependence.  We term  this
the arms race  multiplier  (ARM):
ARM=  . (3)
(1  - b)
Although we have illustrated the arms race multiplier through a two country model,  it
applies  wherever  neighboring  countries  face  a  common  exogenous  shock  to  their
military spending,  regardless  of the number of countries  involved.  Using the  results
from the first regression  in Table  1 the ARM is 2.52.  That the ARM is much greater
than unity suggests that where  common exogenous influences  are important, there is a
major difference  between  the uncoordinated  (arms race)  level of military expenditure
and the level that would be chosen through coordination.
There  are  several  circumstances  in  which  neighboring  countries  indeed  face  a
common  exogenous  increase  in  their  military  spending.  We  now  consider  a
particularly important  one,  namely,  if neighbors have  a  war with  each other.  Recall
that our core regression  finds  that once  a country has participated  in an international
war it exogenously  chooses a considerably higher level of military spending.  In terms
of Figure  1, if the initial equilibrium is disturbed by a war between the two neighbors,
both  A  and  B  are  subject  to  a  common  shock  which  increases  their  exogenous
expenditures.  These  exogenous  increases  then trigger  responses  that raise  the  new
equilibrium  levels of spending to E3. From Table  1, the coefficient  on the dummy for
previous  participation  in  international  warfare  implies  an  exogenous  increase  in
military spending of 1.2 percentage points.  This exogenous  increase  is augmented  by
the arms race multiplier,  so that the equilibrium  increase  is three percentage points of
GDP.  In  turn,  this  has  implications  for  the  cost  of warfare:  in  the  absence  of
negotiated  reductions  in post-conflict  military spending,  much of the true cost of an
international war might accrue after it  is  over.  As  an  illustration,  the  brief  war
between  Ethiopia and Eritrea  in 2000 has  currently left a legacy of military spending
far  above intemational  norms  in both countries:  7% of GDP in  Ethiopia and 24%  in
the  less populated  Eritrea.  If these high levels  of spending  persist, their present value
could  easily  exceed  the costs incurred  during the war.  Although both countries have
other neighbors,  for military purposes  each country may regard the other  as the only
pertinent  neighbor  for determining the  appropriate  level of military spending, so that
chosen spending is highly interdependent.
The  ARM  applies  only if both  the  country  and  its  neighbors  experience  a  common
exogenous increase in military expenditure.  If only one country exogenously increases
its expenditure, then there are two arms race multipliers, that for the country with the
initial  increase  (the  'arms race multiplier  for own  expenditure'  : ARMOE),  and that
9for the neighbors  (ARMNE).  Now the multipliers  depend critically upon the number
of pertinent neighbors. Where there is only a single neighbor, the multipliers are:
ARMOE =  )  and  ARMNE  =  b
(1 - b2)  Q  (1-b  2)
Applying the regression coefficient, ARMOE = 1.57, and ARMNE = 0.95.
For purposes of illustration,  imagine that Chile  and Argentina were to consider  each
other  as  the  only pertinent  neighbor  for military  purposes.  Suppose,  hypothetically,
that the government of Chile decided to purchase  military aircraft  at a cost of $100m
in excess of the original military budget.  Given these suppositions, if responses were
to conform  to the  global behavioral  norm, the eventual  cost to  Chile of its  decision
would be $157m and that to Argentina  $95m. Consider  the implications  of ARMOE
and ARMNE for Chilean decision takers. If they were to take the naYve view that their
decision would not alter the decision  of Argentina,  then their cost-benefit  analysis of
whether  to increase  military spending  would  weigh the  gains  of achieving  a $100m
military advantage  over Argentina, versus the opportunity  costs in terms of foregone
altemative  expenditures.  This naive view would  considerably mis-state the true cost-
benefit calculation.  The true budgetary cost to Chile would eventually be $157m, and
the  military  advantage  over  Argentina  would  be  only  $62m.  More  generally,  the
'benefit'  of incremental exogenous expenditure  is:
a(mA - mB ) -0.62,  (4)
aa
while its cost is the ARMOE,  so that the naYve  calculation  would exaggerate  benefits
relative to costs by 2.52, that is by the same factor as the ARM.
As the number of pertinent neighbors increases the ARMOE and the ARMNE decline.
Generalizing to the n-country case:
ARMOE  =  1  (5)
(_(  b  I)2
and
b
ARMNE  n-I  (6)
Thus, as the number of neighbors increases,  the arms race multipliers converge to the
following values:  ARMOE  - I as  n -1  - oo  and  ARMNE  - O  as  n -1  -+  oo.  This
convergence  is quite rapid as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
10So far we  have  considered  two types  of exogenous  adverse  shocks:  an  intemational
war and a unilateral increase  in military spending by one country.  We now consider a
favorable  shock,  democratization.  From  Table  1, if a  country's  political  system
switches  from  dictatorship  to  full  democracy,  its  military  expenditure  will  fall  by
around  two  percent  of  GDP.  For  the  country  which  democratizes  this  is  then
augmented  by  the  ARMOE.  To  continue  with  our  Chile-Argentina  hypothetical
example, the democratization  of Chile in the 1  990s would eventually have reduced its
military  expenditure  by  around  3.1  percent  of GDP.  Further,  due  to  the  ARMNE,
Argentina  would have reduced  its spending by 1.9 percent of GDP. Thus, there  is not
only a national  'democracy  dividend'  due to a fall in military expenditure, but through
the  ARMNE  democracy  has  a  regional  public  good  effect  enabling  neighbors  to
reduce their expenditures.  Govemments  thus have a direct economic interest that their
neighbors  should be democratic.
Finally, we consider the effect of an increase in the risk of civil war of ten percentage
points  across  a  neighborhood.  Such  an  increased  neighborhood  risk  might  arise
because  of  the  greater  availability  of armaments.  For  example,  during  the  social
breakdown  in  Albania  the  huge  government  stores  of  military  equipment  were
ransacked,  and  this  made  rebellion  easier  over  the  entire  Balkan  area.  Such  an
increase  in risk would directly raise  military spending in each country  by around 0.4
percent of GDP. This would  in turn be increased through the ARM to one percent  of
GDP. Hence,  through its effect on the military spending of neighbors,  the risk of civil
war is  a regional  public  bad.  Similarly,  civil  war in one country  is itself a regional
public bad, directly raising military expenditure in that country by around  1.8 percent
of GDP.  Through  the  ARMOE  this  is  increased  to  2.9  percent,  and  through  the
ARMNE,  the expenditure of neighboring  countries  is raised by 1.7 percent.
4. How Effective  is Military Expenditure in Deterring Rebellion?
In  Section 3 we  quantified  the  effects  of regional  military expenditure  as a regional
public  'bad'.  However,  potentially,  military  expenditure  is  also  a  regional  public
good.  As  noted above,  via the  ARMNE,  civil  war is a regional  public  bad.  This  is
consistent  with Murdoch  and Sandler  (2002) who find that civil  war in one  country
reduces  the  growth  rate across  an  entire  neighborhood.  In  Section  2  we  found  that
governnents  respond  to  the  objective  risk of civil  war by  increasing  their military
expenditure.  If this expenditure  is effective in reducing the risk of civil war then there
is  an  offsetting  positive  externality.  The  net  neighborhood  externality  of military
spending would therefore be a priori  ambiguous.
Our model  of the risk of rebellion  enables  us to  investigate  the efficacy of military
spending  as a deterrent.  Clearly,  since military  spending rises  in correct  anticipation
of rebellion,  unless  this  effect  is  controlled  for,  spending  will  spuriously  appear  to
increase  the  risk of rebellion.  To allow  for this we therefore  instrument for military
expenditure.  Fortunately,  as  established  in  Section  2,  there  are  some  powerful
influences on military expenditure which are unrelated to the risk of rebellion, notably
external  threats.  Since  countries  differ  enormously  in the  extent  of external  threats
they  differ  considerably  in the  level  of military  expenditure.  We  therefore  predict
military  expenditure  using  the  preferred  regression  of  Table  1,  excluding  the
coefficient on internal risk. The resulting instrumented  military expenditure  is entered
as an explanatory variable in our model of rebellion.  The results are shown in Table 2.
11Table 2: Deterrence Effects of Military Expenditure on Rebellion
1  2  3
Ln GDP per capita  -1.068  -1.053  -1.265
(0.287)***  (0.285)***  (0.326)***
(GDP growth)t-1 -0.074  -0.0812  -0.054
(0.046) p=0.1 1  (0.048)*  (0.051)
Primary commodity exports/GDP  16.988  17.083  20.053
(5.553)***  (5.532)***  (6.787)***
(Primary commodity exports/GDP)2 -23.763  -24.060  -31.026
(10.462)**  (10.367)**  (13.825)**
Social fractionalization  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003
(0.0001)***  (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***
Ethnic dominance (45-90%)  0.540  0.534  0.581
(0.358)  (0.358)  (0.399)
Peace duration  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004
(0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***
In Population  0.377  0.366  0.540
(0.142)***  (0.144)***  (0.181)***
Geographic  concentration  -0.889  -0.964  -1.545
(0.975)  (0.998)  (1.097)





'Efficient'Military  expenditure  0.081
(0.074)
'Inefficient'  military Expenditure  -0.054
(0.064)
N  611  611  495
No of wars  43  43  34
Pseudo R2 0.22  0.22  0.26
Log likelihood  -122.11  -121.31  -97.99
Notes: Dependent variable  is a bivariate  indicator of an occurrence of civil war in any given sub-period
1965-69,  ...,  1995-99.  All  regression  include  a  constant.  Standard  errors  in parentheses.  *  *  *
indicate significance  at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Predicted  military  expenditure  is  completely  insignificant  in  explaining  rebellion
(column  1).  This is quite  a striking result since there is a wide variation in predicted
military  expenditure.  We  would  therefore  expect  that were  military  expenditure  to
have a substantial deterrence  effect it would be observable  in this regression.  We also
experimented  with non-linear  effects  (column  2), predicted  military expenditure  and
its square  are  neither  individually  nor jointly  significant.  We  investigate  further  by
attempting to disaggregate  military expenditure into two components:  'more effective'
and  'less  effective'  in terms  of military  power.  The  idea  is  to distinguish  between
spending which purchases military power, and that which simply reflects waste. Were
we  able  to make  such  a  distinction  empirically,  we  would  expect  only  'effective'
military  expenditure  even  potentially  to have  a  deterrence  effect.  In  practice,  our
empirical  proxies  are  sufficiently  crude  that the  most that can  be  hoped  is that  the
military  expenditures  that  they measure  are  differentially  effective.  We  define  the
12more  effective  component  as  that which is a response  to some  genuine reflection  of
the external  threat and the ability to finance deterrence.  We proxy this by the military
expenditure of neighbors,  by whether there has been a previous  intemational war, by
the size of population,  and by per capita GDP, so that effective military expenditure is
the sum of the military expenditure  predicted by the coefficients on these variables  in
Table  1. We  define  the  less  effective  component  as  that  induced  by  the  lack  of
democratization,  which is  more  likely to reflect  patronage.  In the  event,  neither of
these components  is close to significance (column 3).
Thus, although governments  increase military spending  in an effort to deter rebellion,
the  expenditure  appears  to  be  ineffective.  Evidently,  once  a  war  has  developed,
military  spending  can  influence  its  outcome,  but  during  the  inception  stage  of
rebellion  a  large  military response  might be  ineffective,  or even  counterproductive:
excessive repression  by government  forces assists rebel recruitment and appears to be
a  common  error  of  counter-insurgency.  Indirectly,  military  spending  might  even
inadvertently  increase  the  risk  of  conflict  through  its  adverse  effect  on  economic
growth.  Knight,  et  al.  (1996)  find  that  military  expenditure  significantly  reduces
growth, while we find that growth  reduces the risk of rebellion  (Collier and Hoeffler,
2002a, 2002b).
5. Conclusion:  Some  Implications for Policy
We  have  found  that  the  level  of military  expenditure  chosen  by a  government  is
strongly  influenced by the levels  chosen  by neighboring  governments.  This creates
multiplier  effects  for  the other influences  on military spending,  notably  war and  the
threat  of  war.  Since  the  incidence  of civil  war  is  around  ten  times  higher  than
intemational  war,  it is  the  former  that is  the more  important  influence  on military
spending.  We  found  that while  military spending  responds  to the objective  risk of
civil  war,  it  is not  effective  in  reducing  that  risk:  military  spending  does  not deter
rebellion.
The  conjunction  of  an  arms  race  effect  with  the  absence  of a  deterrence  effect
suggests  that  military  expenditure  is  a  regional  public  'bad'.  Even  if international
deterrence  is  effective,  approximately  the  same  level  of  external  security  can
presumably be achieved  over a wide range of military expenditure as long as an entire
neighborhood  changes  its level of spending  in common.  Since military spending  is a
regional public bad it will be over-supplied by national-level decisions.
During peacetime,  the  decisions  of one  country  on  military expenditure  powerfully
affect those of its neighbors. Because  spending is so closely matched by neighbors,  an
increase in military spending by one country has little effect upon its external security.
Further, it has no discemable  effect upon  deterring intemal  insecurity.  This provides
two  reasons  for  thinking  that military  spending  is  usually  excessive.  Govemments
may  well  not  be  fully  aware  of  the  ineffectiveness  of military  expenditure  in
enhancing both external and intemal security. As noted above, if they fail to recognize
the arms race multiplier  effects,  they substantially  exaggerate  the contribution  of an
increase  in  the  military  budget  to  extemal  security.  Similarly,  many  govenmments
might imagine  that in strengthening the military they are deterring rebellion.  Further,
even if governments  are  fully  aware  of the  arms  race  effects,  unless  their  military
13expenditure is coordinated with their neighbors it will still be excessive.  The regional
negative externalities  of unilateral decisions need to be  internalized  through regional
coordination.
Since  the  spillovers  are regional  rather  than  global,  and  since  coordination  usually
becomes more difficult as the number of players increase, the most important forum is
likely to be the region. Regions have indeed invested enormous effort in some aspects
of policy coordination.  However,  this has been predominantly  focused upon lowering
regional  barriers  to  trade.  Regional  trade  agreements  have  become  so  popular that
globally  there  are  now  agreements  than  there  are  countries  (World  Bank,  2000).
However,  regional  cooperation on reciprocal reduction  of trade restrictions  probably
offers far  less  scope  for mutual benefits  than cooperation  on reciprocal  reduction in
military spending.  Preferential  tariff reductions  create powerful redistribution effects
within the region,  so that some  countries, and almost  certainly some sectors within a
country,  may lose  absolutely.  By contrast, reciprocal  reductions  in military spending
can readily be designed to be mutually beneficial while leaving security unaffected.
Despite this scope for regional  coordination of military spending, such agreements  are
rare.  An  important  obstacle  to  reaching  an  agreement  is  the  low  observability  of
military expenditure.  If such expenditures are only observable with a long lag, the first
government  to breach  the agreement can gain a temporary military advantage  and so
launch  a  successful  war.  During  the  Cold  War  these  problems  were  resolved  by
expensive  technologies  of observation.  Most  govenmments  of developing  countries
lack  such technology.  In  this  situation  the  IFIs may  have a  facilitating  role both as
neutral but privileged observers  and as extemal enforcers  of regional agreements  (see
Murshed  and Sen  (1995)  for a discussion of the  scope for IFI peace conditionality).
The IFIs have much better access to information on military spending than is available
to hostile  neighboring  govermments.  They  can  potentially  impose  aid reductions  in
response  to  breaches  of regional  agreements  that  would  sharply  raise  the  cost  of
increasing military budgets.  Such a practice would not require the IFIs to take sides in
political  disputes.  Rather,  any  actions  would  be  responses  which  were  already
authorized by regional agreements which the IFIs had been invited to underwrite.
The donor community has a further interest in the reduction of military expenditure in
aid-recipient  countries.  Military  expenditure  in the context  of poverty  is rightly  seen
as wasteful.  Hence,  donors  quite reasonably  attempt  to reduce  the  level  of military
expenditure  by  aid recipients.  Our  analysis  has  suggested  a further justification  for
such efforts, namely as a coordinating  device that a region can itself use for reciprocal
reductions  in expenditure.  In the absence  of a natural regional  leader willing to incur
the costs of such leadership, a donor norm can supply a credible common target.
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Table Al: Descriptive Statistics
mean  st. dev.  min.  max.  N
Military Expenditure  3.355  4.275  0.1  45.96  563
International War  0.073  0.260  0  1  563
Civil War  0.078  0.269  0  1  563
External Threat  0.226  0.418  0  1  563
Neighbors' Military Expenditure  3.578  3.488  0  22.211  563
In Population  15.984  1.42  12.716  20.773  563
Internal Threat  0.053  0.075  0  0.608  563
Democracy  4.195  4.370  0  10  563
In GDP per capita  7.853  1.050  5.403  9.852  563
Aid/GDPw 1 4.608  6.278  -0.047  55.240  382
17Data
The model presented in Table 2 primarily uses data from Collier and Hoeffler (2002a)
and the data can be obtained from Anke Hoeffler's website:
http://users.ox.ac.uk/IballO 144.
Aid/GDP
We  measure  aid  as  the percentage  of official  overseas  development  assistance  and
official aid in GDP.  Aid and GDP are measured  in current US dollars  and we use the
average  percentage over the preceding  five years in our analysis.  Data source:  World
Development Indicators  1999.
Civil War
Is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the country experienced a civil war
during the period. A civil war is defined as an internal conflict in which at least  1,000
battle related deaths (civilian  and military) occurred per year. We use mainly the data
collected  by  Singer  and  Small  (1984,  1994)  and  according  to  their  definitions
Nicholas Sambanis updated their data set for 1992-99.
Democracy
Measures the general  openness  of the political  institutions, it ranges  from zero  (low)
to ten  (high).  The  data source  is  the Polity  III data  set as  discussed  by Jaggers  and
Gurr (1995).
Ethnic dominance (45-90%)
Using  the  ethno-linguistic  data  from the  original  data  source  (Atlas  Naradov  Mira,
1964) we calculated an indicator of ethnic dominance.  This variable takes the value of
one  if  one  single  ethno-linguistic  group  makes  up  45  to  90  percent  of the  total
population  and zero otherwise.
External Threat
Is a dummy variable  which  takes  a value  of one  once  a country  was  involved in  an
international  war.  Here we consider all international  wars after WWII.  The main data
source is Singer and Small (1984,  1994).  We updated this data set by using Gleditsch
et al (2002), this resulted in the addition of two international  wars (Ethiopia - Eritrea,
1998-ongoing as of the end of 1999) and  India and  Pakistan (1999-ongoing  as of the
end of 1999).
(GDP growth)t,
Using the above income per capita measure  we calculated  the average annual growth
rate  as a proxy of economic  opportunities.  This variable  is measured  in the previous
five year period.
Geographic Concentration
We  constructed a  dispersion  index of the  population  on a country by country  basis.
Based  on  population  data  for  400km2 cells  we  generated  a  Gini  coefficient  of
population dispersion  for each  country.  A value of 0 indicates  that the population  is
evenly  distributed  across  the  country  and  a  value  of  1 indicates  that  the  total
18population  is concentrated  in one area. Data is available  for 1990 and  1995.  For years
prior to  1990 we used the 1990 data.
Internal Threat
Is the predicted probability of a civil war breaking out. This prediction  is based on the
core model as presented in Collier and Hoeffler (2002a).
International War
Is  a  dummy  variable  which  takes  a  value  of  one  if the  country  experienced  an
intemational war during the period.  The main data source is Singer and  Small (1984,
1994).  We updated  this data  set by using Gleditsch  et al (2002),  this resulted  in the
addition of two intemational  wars (Ethiopia - Eritrea,  1998-ongoing as of the end of
1999) and India and Pakistan (1  999-ongoing as of the end of 1999).
In  GDP per capita
We measure  income as real PPP adjusted GDP per capita. The primary data set is the
Penn World Tables  5.6 (Summers  and Heston  1991).  Since the  data is only available
from 1960-92 we used the growth rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per capita data from
the World Bank's World Development Indicators  1998 in order to obtain income data
for 1995.  Income  data is measured at the beginning  of each sub-period,  1965,  1970,
...,  1995.
In  Population
Population  measures the total population,  the data source  is the World Bank's World
Development Indicators  1998. Again, we measure population a the beginning of each
sub-period.
Israel
Is  a  dummy  variable  which takes  the  value  of one  for Israel  and  zero  for all  other
countries.
Military Expenditure
Military  expenditure  is measured as a proportion of GDP, also commonly referred  to
as  the  defense  burden.  Data  for  1960-90  was  obtained  from  the  Stockholm
Intemational  Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI)  and  we  used  data  from  the  Global
Development Network for 1991-1999.
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm
Neighbors' Military Expenditure
For country i we calculated the weighted average of the neighbors' defense burden by
dividing the sum of the neighbors' total military expenditure, Mi, by the sum of the
neighbors' total national income,  Yi:
N
XMj
mi  =  N  where  i  j  and  n =1,...,N
~yj
i=l
19For our  analysis  we  excluded  countries  for  which we  had  no  military expenditure
data. We are grateful to James Murdoch and Todd Sandler who made their data set on
neighbors  available  to us (Murdoch  and  Sandler,  2002).  Income  data  was obtained
from the Penn World Table  (see data source for In GDP per capita).  We multiplied
the RGDPCH series by the total population to calculate total income.
Peace Duration
This variable  measures  the  length of the peace  period  since the  end of the previous
civil war.  For countries  which never experienced  a civil  war we measure  the peace
period  since  the  end of World  War  II  until  1962  (172  months)  and  add  60 peace
months in each consecutive  five year period.
Primary commodity  exports/GDP
The  ratio  of primary  commodity exports  to GDP  proxies  the  abundance  of natural
resources.  The data on primary commodity exports as well as GDP was obtained from
the World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current US dollars.  The data is
measured at the beginning of each sub-period,  1965,  1970, ...,  1995.
Social fractionalization
We  proxy  social  fractionalization  in  a  combined  measure  of ethnic  and  religious
fractionalization.  Ethnic  fractionalization  is  measured  by  the  ethno-linguistic
fractionalization  index.  It  measures  the  probability  that  two  randomly  drawn
individuals  from  a  given  country  do  not  speak  the  same  language.  Data  is  only
available for  1960. In the economics  literature this measure  was first used by Mauro
(1995). Using  data from Barro (1997)  and Barrett (1982)  on religious  affiliations we
constructed  an analogous religious fractionalization  index. Following Barro (1997) we
aggregated  the various religious  affiliations  into nine categories:  Catholic, Protestant,
Muslim,  Jew,  Hindu, Buddhist,  Eastern  Religions  (other  than Buddhist), Indigenous
Religions  and  no religious  affiliation.  Data  is  available  for  1970  and  1980  and  the
values are very similar. For 1960,  1965 and 1970 we used the 1970 data and for 1980,
1985,  1990 and  1995  we use the  1980 data.  For 1975  we use the average of the  1970
and 1980 data.
The fractionalization  indices range from zero to  100. A value of zero  indicates that the
society  is  completely  homogenous  whereas  a  value  of  100  would  characterize  a
completely heterogeneous society. We calculated our social fractionalization  index  as
the product of the ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  and the religious  fractionalization
index  plus  the ethno-linguistic  or the religious  fractionalization  index, whichever  is
the greater.  By adding either index we avoid classifying  a country  as homogenous  (a
value of zero) if the  country is ethnically homogenous  but religiously  divers,  or vice
versa.
War starts
The  dependent variable  in Table  2, 'war  starts',  takes  a value of one  if a civil  war
started during the period and zero if the country is at peace. If a war started in period t
and continues in t+l  we record the value  of the war started value as missing.  A civil
war  is  defined  as  an  intemal  conflict  in  which  at  least  1000  battle  related  deaths
(civilian and military)  occurred per year.  We use mainly the data collected  by Singer
and Small (1984,  1994) and according to their definitions  Nicholas Sambanis updated
their data set for 1992-99.
201995-99
Is a dummy variable which takes a value  of one for the time period  1995-99 and zero
for all other periods.
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